Patterson D. M. Dworkin on the Semantics of Legal and Political Concepts / trans. from Engl. A. B. Didikin, S. A. Aleksandrov
In a recent comment on H. L. A. Hart’s «Postscript» to The Concept of Law, Ronald Dworkin claims that the meaning of legal and political concepts maybe understood by analogy to the meaning of natural kind concepts like «tiger», «gold» and «water». This article questions the efficacy of Dworkin’s...
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Main Authors: | , |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Omsk State Technical University, Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education
2021-05-01
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Series: | Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность" |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.omgtu.ru/general_information/media_omgtu/journal_of_omsk_research_journal/files/arhiv/2021/%D0%A2.%206,%20%E2%84%96%202%20(%D0%9E%D0%98%D0%A1)/83-93%20%D0%9F%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%BD%20%D0%94.%20%D0%9C..pdf |
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Summary: | In a recent comment on H. L. A. Hart’s «Postscript» to The Concept of Law, Ronald
Dworkin claims that the meaning of legal and political concepts maybe understood
by analogy to the meaning of natural kind concepts like «tiger», «gold» and
«water». This article questions the efficacy of Dworkin’s claims by challenging
the use of natural kinds as the basis for a semantic theory of legal and political
concepts. Additionally, in matters of value there is no methodological equivalent
to the scientific method. Thus, there is little hope of finding hidden essences to
explain the meaning of legal and political concepts. Finally, even if there are natural
kinds, Dworkin’s arguments for their efficacy in jurisprudence are problematic
and unpersuasive. The problem for Dworkin is that his embrace of natural kinds
undermines the «fit» side of the fit/justification model of adjudication that lies at
the heart of his theory of law |
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ISSN: | 2542-0488 2541-7983 |