Lyapunov Stability in the Cournot Duopoly Game

This paper studies Lyapunov stability at a point and its application in the Cournot duopoly game. We first explore the relationship between Lyapunov stability at a point, nonsensitivity and non-Devaney chaos and find that a dynamical system is nonsensitive and non-Devaney chaotic if there is a point...

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Main Authors: Dan Zhu, Debing Ni
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2023-01-01
Series:Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2023/7309724
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author Dan Zhu
Debing Ni
author_facet Dan Zhu
Debing Ni
author_sort Dan Zhu
collection DOAJ
description This paper studies Lyapunov stability at a point and its application in the Cournot duopoly game. We first explore the relationship between Lyapunov stability at a point, nonsensitivity and non-Devaney chaos and find that a dynamical system is nonsensitive and non-Devaney chaotic if there is a point in this system such that it is Lyapunov stable at that point. We next prove a group of equivalent characterizations of Lyapunov stability at a point to deduce the composite theorems and product theorems of Lyapunov stability at a point, and then we prove three equivalent characterizations of the Cournot duopoly system to demonstrate that this system is Lyapunov stable at its unique nonzero fixed point (Cournot equilibrium point) when the unit costs of the Cournot double oligarchies satisfy certain conditions. Therefore, we conclude that the Cournot duopoly system is safe relative to both sensitivity and Devaney chaos. The robustness of our results are also verified by conducting numerical simulations in the Cournot duopoly game.
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institution Kabale University
issn 1607-887X
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publishDate 2023-01-01
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series Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
spelling doaj-art-14f1e6fb6579402bb31e3620d0a170f72025-02-03T06:42:40ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1607-887X2023-01-01202310.1155/2023/7309724Lyapunov Stability in the Cournot Duopoly GameDan Zhu0Debing Ni1Wu Jinglian School of EconomicsSchool of Management and EconomicsThis paper studies Lyapunov stability at a point and its application in the Cournot duopoly game. We first explore the relationship between Lyapunov stability at a point, nonsensitivity and non-Devaney chaos and find that a dynamical system is nonsensitive and non-Devaney chaotic if there is a point in this system such that it is Lyapunov stable at that point. We next prove a group of equivalent characterizations of Lyapunov stability at a point to deduce the composite theorems and product theorems of Lyapunov stability at a point, and then we prove three equivalent characterizations of the Cournot duopoly system to demonstrate that this system is Lyapunov stable at its unique nonzero fixed point (Cournot equilibrium point) when the unit costs of the Cournot double oligarchies satisfy certain conditions. Therefore, we conclude that the Cournot duopoly system is safe relative to both sensitivity and Devaney chaos. The robustness of our results are also verified by conducting numerical simulations in the Cournot duopoly game.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2023/7309724
spellingShingle Dan Zhu
Debing Ni
Lyapunov Stability in the Cournot Duopoly Game
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
title Lyapunov Stability in the Cournot Duopoly Game
title_full Lyapunov Stability in the Cournot Duopoly Game
title_fullStr Lyapunov Stability in the Cournot Duopoly Game
title_full_unstemmed Lyapunov Stability in the Cournot Duopoly Game
title_short Lyapunov Stability in the Cournot Duopoly Game
title_sort lyapunov stability in the cournot duopoly game
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2023/7309724
work_keys_str_mv AT danzhu lyapunovstabilityinthecournotduopolygame
AT debingni lyapunovstabilityinthecournotduopolygame