Lyapunov Stability in the Cournot Duopoly Game
This paper studies Lyapunov stability at a point and its application in the Cournot duopoly game. We first explore the relationship between Lyapunov stability at a point, nonsensitivity and non-Devaney chaos and find that a dynamical system is nonsensitive and non-Devaney chaotic if there is a point...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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Wiley
2023-01-01
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Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2023/7309724 |
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author | Dan Zhu Debing Ni |
author_facet | Dan Zhu Debing Ni |
author_sort | Dan Zhu |
collection | DOAJ |
description | This paper studies Lyapunov stability at a point and its application in the Cournot duopoly game. We first explore the relationship between Lyapunov stability at a point, nonsensitivity and non-Devaney chaos and find that a dynamical system is nonsensitive and non-Devaney chaotic if there is a point in this system such that it is Lyapunov stable at that point. We next prove a group of equivalent characterizations of Lyapunov stability at a point to deduce the composite theorems and product theorems of Lyapunov stability at a point, and then we prove three equivalent characterizations of the Cournot duopoly system to demonstrate that this system is Lyapunov stable at its unique nonzero fixed point (Cournot equilibrium point) when the unit costs of the Cournot double oligarchies satisfy certain conditions. Therefore, we conclude that the Cournot duopoly system is safe relative to both sensitivity and Devaney chaos. The robustness of our results are also verified by conducting numerical simulations in the Cournot duopoly game. |
format | Article |
id | doaj-art-14f1e6fb6579402bb31e3620d0a170f7 |
institution | Kabale University |
issn | 1607-887X |
language | English |
publishDate | 2023-01-01 |
publisher | Wiley |
record_format | Article |
series | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
spelling | doaj-art-14f1e6fb6579402bb31e3620d0a170f72025-02-03T06:42:40ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1607-887X2023-01-01202310.1155/2023/7309724Lyapunov Stability in the Cournot Duopoly GameDan Zhu0Debing Ni1Wu Jinglian School of EconomicsSchool of Management and EconomicsThis paper studies Lyapunov stability at a point and its application in the Cournot duopoly game. We first explore the relationship between Lyapunov stability at a point, nonsensitivity and non-Devaney chaos and find that a dynamical system is nonsensitive and non-Devaney chaotic if there is a point in this system such that it is Lyapunov stable at that point. We next prove a group of equivalent characterizations of Lyapunov stability at a point to deduce the composite theorems and product theorems of Lyapunov stability at a point, and then we prove three equivalent characterizations of the Cournot duopoly system to demonstrate that this system is Lyapunov stable at its unique nonzero fixed point (Cournot equilibrium point) when the unit costs of the Cournot double oligarchies satisfy certain conditions. Therefore, we conclude that the Cournot duopoly system is safe relative to both sensitivity and Devaney chaos. The robustness of our results are also verified by conducting numerical simulations in the Cournot duopoly game.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2023/7309724 |
spellingShingle | Dan Zhu Debing Ni Lyapunov Stability in the Cournot Duopoly Game Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
title | Lyapunov Stability in the Cournot Duopoly Game |
title_full | Lyapunov Stability in the Cournot Duopoly Game |
title_fullStr | Lyapunov Stability in the Cournot Duopoly Game |
title_full_unstemmed | Lyapunov Stability in the Cournot Duopoly Game |
title_short | Lyapunov Stability in the Cournot Duopoly Game |
title_sort | lyapunov stability in the cournot duopoly game |
url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2023/7309724 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT danzhu lyapunovstabilityinthecournotduopolygame AT debingni lyapunovstabilityinthecournotduopolygame |