Integration, Game, and Sustainable Development of Shenzhen Port Based on Governmental Regulations

The internal integration, game, and sustainable development of Shenzhen Port play key roles in developing a synergy mechanism among Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau Greater Bay Area (GBA) ports. Using a logistics model, a parameter estimation and evolutionary analysis of Shenzhen Port were performed, revea...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Xuanfei Wang, Shan Liang, Zhenjie Liao
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2022-01-01
Series:Journal of Mathematics
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/2583027
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
_version_ 1832554747413921792
author Xuanfei Wang
Shan Liang
Zhenjie Liao
author_facet Xuanfei Wang
Shan Liang
Zhenjie Liao
author_sort Xuanfei Wang
collection DOAJ
description The internal integration, game, and sustainable development of Shenzhen Port play key roles in developing a synergy mechanism among Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau Greater Bay Area (GBA) ports. Using a logistics model, a parameter estimation and evolutionary analysis of Shenzhen Port were performed, revealing that it requires a new impetus to promote growth in its container throughput. Based on the population ecology theory, a two-population Lotka-Volterra model was used to discuss the activity and mutual effect between the western and eastern port areas of Shenzhen Port, quantitatively measuring the varying degrees of the hindering effects between them. To reduce competition and strengthen cooperation, a port game matrix with a punishment mechanism of governmental regulations was created to discuss the internal integration of Shenzhen Port. The results show that, along with the promoting effect of port cooperation on the increase in container throughput, there is a gradual increase in the punishment of speculative behaviours. Government-dominated port cooperation prevents the prisoner’s dilemma in the port activity process. The findings of this study provide quantitative data support and decision-making references for achieving resource complementarity, developing synergy mechanisms, and attaining sustainable development in Shenzhen Port.
format Article
id doaj-art-0f8d8c975ee64bccb5e7b67853ab86dc
institution Kabale University
issn 2314-4785
language English
publishDate 2022-01-01
publisher Wiley
record_format Article
series Journal of Mathematics
spelling doaj-art-0f8d8c975ee64bccb5e7b67853ab86dc2025-02-03T05:50:36ZengWileyJournal of Mathematics2314-47852022-01-01202210.1155/2022/2583027Integration, Game, and Sustainable Development of Shenzhen Port Based on Governmental RegulationsXuanfei Wang0Shan Liang1Zhenjie Liao2Department of Electronic CommerceSchool of EconomicSchool of ManagementThe internal integration, game, and sustainable development of Shenzhen Port play key roles in developing a synergy mechanism among Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau Greater Bay Area (GBA) ports. Using a logistics model, a parameter estimation and evolutionary analysis of Shenzhen Port were performed, revealing that it requires a new impetus to promote growth in its container throughput. Based on the population ecology theory, a two-population Lotka-Volterra model was used to discuss the activity and mutual effect between the western and eastern port areas of Shenzhen Port, quantitatively measuring the varying degrees of the hindering effects between them. To reduce competition and strengthen cooperation, a port game matrix with a punishment mechanism of governmental regulations was created to discuss the internal integration of Shenzhen Port. The results show that, along with the promoting effect of port cooperation on the increase in container throughput, there is a gradual increase in the punishment of speculative behaviours. Government-dominated port cooperation prevents the prisoner’s dilemma in the port activity process. The findings of this study provide quantitative data support and decision-making references for achieving resource complementarity, developing synergy mechanisms, and attaining sustainable development in Shenzhen Port.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/2583027
spellingShingle Xuanfei Wang
Shan Liang
Zhenjie Liao
Integration, Game, and Sustainable Development of Shenzhen Port Based on Governmental Regulations
Journal of Mathematics
title Integration, Game, and Sustainable Development of Shenzhen Port Based on Governmental Regulations
title_full Integration, Game, and Sustainable Development of Shenzhen Port Based on Governmental Regulations
title_fullStr Integration, Game, and Sustainable Development of Shenzhen Port Based on Governmental Regulations
title_full_unstemmed Integration, Game, and Sustainable Development of Shenzhen Port Based on Governmental Regulations
title_short Integration, Game, and Sustainable Development of Shenzhen Port Based on Governmental Regulations
title_sort integration game and sustainable development of shenzhen port based on governmental regulations
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/2583027
work_keys_str_mv AT xuanfeiwang integrationgameandsustainabledevelopmentofshenzhenportbasedongovernmentalregulations
AT shanliang integrationgameandsustainabledevelopmentofshenzhenportbasedongovernmentalregulations
AT zhenjieliao integrationgameandsustainabledevelopmentofshenzhenportbasedongovernmentalregulations