Restrain Price Collusion in Trade-Based Supply Chain Finance
Collusion can increase the transaction value among supply chain members to obtain higher loans from supply chain finance (SCF) service provider, which will bring some serious risks for SCF. However, it is difficult to be identified and restrain the SCF service provider due to its stability and hidde...
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2021-01-01
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| Series: | Complexity |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5554501 |
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| _version_ | 1832561406915903488 |
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| author | Qiang Wei Xinyu Gou Tianyu Deng Chunguang Bai |
| author_facet | Qiang Wei Xinyu Gou Tianyu Deng Chunguang Bai |
| author_sort | Qiang Wei |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Collusion can increase the transaction value among supply chain members to obtain higher loans from supply chain finance (SCF) service provider, which will bring some serious risks for SCF. However, it is difficult to be identified and restrain the SCF service provider due to its stability and hiddenness. Different SCF transaction structures will affect the profits of supply chain members from collusion. This paper develops various game models for collusion and not collusion for different SCF transaction structures and investigates the impact of SCF transaction structures on the boundary conditions of collusion. Through comparative analysis, the findings of models are as follows: (1) in a two-echelon supply chain, the supplier and retailer are more likely to conduct collusion under the sequential game than under the simultaneous game; (2) collusion in the two-echelon supply chain can obtain higher loans than that in the three-echelon supply chain, so it has more serious hidden danger; (3) in the two-echelon supply chain, collusion is easier to form than in the three-echelon SCF supply chain that has spontaneous endogenous constraints. We also develop two types of mechanisms to restrain collusion behavior from profit sharing and incomplete information perspectives. Finally, we summarize the theoretical implications and analyze the management implications through a case study. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-0f0f75aa97ce4b47b068cf128e9e0f57 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1076-2787 1099-0526 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2021-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Complexity |
| spelling | doaj-art-0f0f75aa97ce4b47b068cf128e9e0f572025-02-03T01:24:59ZengWileyComplexity1076-27871099-05262021-01-01202110.1155/2021/55545015554501Restrain Price Collusion in Trade-Based Supply Chain FinanceQiang Wei0Xinyu Gou1Tianyu Deng2Chunguang Bai3School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, 611731, ChinaSchool of Business Administration, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, 611130, ChinaBusiness School, Southwest Minzu University, Chengdu, 610041, ChinaSchool of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, 611731, ChinaCollusion can increase the transaction value among supply chain members to obtain higher loans from supply chain finance (SCF) service provider, which will bring some serious risks for SCF. However, it is difficult to be identified and restrain the SCF service provider due to its stability and hiddenness. Different SCF transaction structures will affect the profits of supply chain members from collusion. This paper develops various game models for collusion and not collusion for different SCF transaction structures and investigates the impact of SCF transaction structures on the boundary conditions of collusion. Through comparative analysis, the findings of models are as follows: (1) in a two-echelon supply chain, the supplier and retailer are more likely to conduct collusion under the sequential game than under the simultaneous game; (2) collusion in the two-echelon supply chain can obtain higher loans than that in the three-echelon supply chain, so it has more serious hidden danger; (3) in the two-echelon supply chain, collusion is easier to form than in the three-echelon SCF supply chain that has spontaneous endogenous constraints. We also develop two types of mechanisms to restrain collusion behavior from profit sharing and incomplete information perspectives. Finally, we summarize the theoretical implications and analyze the management implications through a case study.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5554501 |
| spellingShingle | Qiang Wei Xinyu Gou Tianyu Deng Chunguang Bai Restrain Price Collusion in Trade-Based Supply Chain Finance Complexity |
| title | Restrain Price Collusion in Trade-Based Supply Chain Finance |
| title_full | Restrain Price Collusion in Trade-Based Supply Chain Finance |
| title_fullStr | Restrain Price Collusion in Trade-Based Supply Chain Finance |
| title_full_unstemmed | Restrain Price Collusion in Trade-Based Supply Chain Finance |
| title_short | Restrain Price Collusion in Trade-Based Supply Chain Finance |
| title_sort | restrain price collusion in trade based supply chain finance |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5554501 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT qiangwei restrainpricecollusionintradebasedsupplychainfinance AT xinyugou restrainpricecollusionintradebasedsupplychainfinance AT tianyudeng restrainpricecollusionintradebasedsupplychainfinance AT chunguangbai restrainpricecollusionintradebasedsupplychainfinance |