Insights from epidemiological game theory into gender-specific vaccination against rubella
Rubella is a highly contagious childhood disease that causesrelatively mild symptoms. However, rubella can result in severecongenital defects, known as congenital rubella syndrome (CRS), iftransmitted from a mother to a fetus. Consequently, women havehigher incentive to vaccinate against rubella t...
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AIMS Press
2009-08-01
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| Series: | Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering |
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| Online Access: | https://www.aimspress.com/article/doi/10.3934/mbe.2009.6.839 |
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| author | Eunha Shim Beth Kochin Alison Galvani |
| author_facet | Eunha Shim Beth Kochin Alison Galvani |
| author_sort | Eunha Shim |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Rubella is a highly contagious childhood disease that causesrelatively mild symptoms. However, rubella can result in severecongenital defects, known as congenital rubella syndrome (CRS), iftransmitted from a mother to a fetus. Consequently, women havehigher incentive to vaccinate against rubella than men do. Withinthe population vaccination reduces transmission but also increasesthe average age of infection and possibly the risk of CRS amongunvaccinated females. To evaluate how the balance among thesefactors results in optimal coverage of vaccination, we developed agame theoretic age-structured epidemiological model of rubellatransmission and vaccination. We found that high levels ofvaccination for both genders are most effective in maximizingaverage utility across the population by decreasing the risk of CRSand reducing transmission of rubella. By contrast, the demands forvaccines driven by self-interest among males and females are $0\%$and $100\%$ acceptance, respectively, if the cost of vaccination isrelatively low. Our results suggest that the rubella vaccination bymales that is likely to be achieved on voluntary basis withoutadditional incentives would have been far lower than the populationoptimum, if rubella vaccine were offered separately instead ofcombined with measles and mumps vaccination as the MMR vaccine. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-0b8255db355a44099f4006ad3a43a808 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1551-0018 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2009-08-01 |
| publisher | AIMS Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering |
| spelling | doaj-art-0b8255db355a44099f4006ad3a43a8082025-01-24T02:00:01ZengAIMS PressMathematical Biosciences and Engineering1551-00182009-08-016483985410.3934/mbe.2009.6.839Insights from epidemiological game theory into gender-specific vaccination against rubellaEunha Shim0Beth Kochin1Alison Galvani2Department of Epidemiology and Public Health, Yale School of Medicine, New Haven, CT 06510Department of Epidemiology and Public Health, Yale School of Medicine, New Haven, CT 06510Department of Epidemiology and Public Health, Yale School of Medicine, New Haven, CT 06510Rubella is a highly contagious childhood disease that causesrelatively mild symptoms. However, rubella can result in severecongenital defects, known as congenital rubella syndrome (CRS), iftransmitted from a mother to a fetus. Consequently, women havehigher incentive to vaccinate against rubella than men do. Withinthe population vaccination reduces transmission but also increasesthe average age of infection and possibly the risk of CRS amongunvaccinated females. To evaluate how the balance among thesefactors results in optimal coverage of vaccination, we developed agame theoretic age-structured epidemiological model of rubellatransmission and vaccination. We found that high levels ofvaccination for both genders are most effective in maximizingaverage utility across the population by decreasing the risk of CRSand reducing transmission of rubella. By contrast, the demands forvaccines driven by self-interest among males and females are $0\%$and $100\%$ acceptance, respectively, if the cost of vaccination isrelatively low. Our results suggest that the rubella vaccination bymales that is likely to be achieved on voluntary basis withoutadditional incentives would have been far lower than the populationoptimum, if rubella vaccine were offered separately instead ofcombined with measles and mumps vaccination as the MMR vaccine.https://www.aimspress.com/article/doi/10.3934/mbe.2009.6.839epidemiology.rubellavaccinationgame theory |
| spellingShingle | Eunha Shim Beth Kochin Alison Galvani Insights from epidemiological game theory into gender-specific vaccination against rubella Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering epidemiology. rubella vaccination game theory |
| title | Insights from epidemiological game theory into gender-specific vaccination against rubella |
| title_full | Insights from epidemiological game theory into gender-specific vaccination against rubella |
| title_fullStr | Insights from epidemiological game theory into gender-specific vaccination against rubella |
| title_full_unstemmed | Insights from epidemiological game theory into gender-specific vaccination against rubella |
| title_short | Insights from epidemiological game theory into gender-specific vaccination against rubella |
| title_sort | insights from epidemiological game theory into gender specific vaccination against rubella |
| topic | epidemiology. rubella vaccination game theory |
| url | https://www.aimspress.com/article/doi/10.3934/mbe.2009.6.839 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT eunhashim insightsfromepidemiologicalgametheoryintogenderspecificvaccinationagainstrubella AT bethkochin insightsfromepidemiologicalgametheoryintogenderspecificvaccinationagainstrubella AT alisongalvani insightsfromepidemiologicalgametheoryintogenderspecificvaccinationagainstrubella |