Game Modelling and Strategy Research on Trilateral Evolution for Coal-Mine Operational Safety Production System: A Simulation Approach
In view of the particularity and high risk of coal mining industry, the decision-making behavior of multiple agents inside the coal-mine enterprise plays a very important role in ensuring the safety and sustainable development of coal mining industry. The existing literature studies on coal-mine saf...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2020-01-01
|
| Series: | Complexity |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/2685238 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1832568123318861824 |
|---|---|
| author | Yan Li Yan Zhang Haifeng Dai Ziyan Zhao |
| author_facet | Yan Li Yan Zhang Haifeng Dai Ziyan Zhao |
| author_sort | Yan Li |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In view of the particularity and high risk of coal mining industry, the decision-making behavior of multiple agents inside the coal-mine enterprise plays a very important role in ensuring the safety and sustainable development of coal mining industry. The existing literature studies on coal-mine safety production focus mainly on statically analyzing the game among the external entities such as the government, the enterprises themselves, and the employees inside the enterprise from a macro perspective,are short of research on revealing the dynamic interactions among the actors directly involved in the coal-mine accidents and also on proposals for effective interactions that will lead to improved safety outcomes. Therefore, this paper explores the use of evolutionary game theory to describe the interactions among the stakeholders in China’s coal-mine safety production system, which includes the organization, the first-line miners, and the first-line managers. Moreover, the paper also explores dynamic simulations of the evolutionary game model to analyze the stability of stakeholder interactions and to identify equilibrium solutions. The simulation results show that when certain conditions are met, the decision-making behavior of the organization, miners, and managers can evolve into the unique ideal steady state (1, 1, 1). In addition, the strategy portfolio with a relatively high initial proportion of three agents converges more quickly to an ideal state than a relatively low strategy portfolio. Moreover, the stable state and equilibrium values are not affected by the initial value changes. Finally, we find that the combination of positive incentive policies and strict penalties policies can make the evolutionary game system converge to desired stability faster. The application of the evolutionary game and numerical simulation when simulating the multiplayer game process of coal-mine safety production is an effective way, which provides a more effective solution to the safety and sustainable development of coal mining industry. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-085f194b8e9741bc863b9218ee5259a2 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1076-2787 1099-0526 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2020-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Complexity |
| spelling | doaj-art-085f194b8e9741bc863b9218ee5259a22025-02-03T00:59:42ZengWileyComplexity1076-27871099-05262020-01-01202010.1155/2020/26852382685238Game Modelling and Strategy Research on Trilateral Evolution for Coal-Mine Operational Safety Production System: A Simulation ApproachYan Li0Yan Zhang1Haifeng Dai2Ziyan Zhao3School of Management, Xi’an University of Science & Technology, Xi’an 710054, ChinaSchool of Management, Xi’an University of Science & Technology, Xi’an 710054, ChinaSchool of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Xi’an Polytechnic University, Xi’an 710600, ChinaFinance Department, China Construction Integrated Housing (Henan) Co. Ltd, Zhengzhou 450000, ChinaIn view of the particularity and high risk of coal mining industry, the decision-making behavior of multiple agents inside the coal-mine enterprise plays a very important role in ensuring the safety and sustainable development of coal mining industry. The existing literature studies on coal-mine safety production focus mainly on statically analyzing the game among the external entities such as the government, the enterprises themselves, and the employees inside the enterprise from a macro perspective,are short of research on revealing the dynamic interactions among the actors directly involved in the coal-mine accidents and also on proposals for effective interactions that will lead to improved safety outcomes. Therefore, this paper explores the use of evolutionary game theory to describe the interactions among the stakeholders in China’s coal-mine safety production system, which includes the organization, the first-line miners, and the first-line managers. Moreover, the paper also explores dynamic simulations of the evolutionary game model to analyze the stability of stakeholder interactions and to identify equilibrium solutions. The simulation results show that when certain conditions are met, the decision-making behavior of the organization, miners, and managers can evolve into the unique ideal steady state (1, 1, 1). In addition, the strategy portfolio with a relatively high initial proportion of three agents converges more quickly to an ideal state than a relatively low strategy portfolio. Moreover, the stable state and equilibrium values are not affected by the initial value changes. Finally, we find that the combination of positive incentive policies and strict penalties policies can make the evolutionary game system converge to desired stability faster. The application of the evolutionary game and numerical simulation when simulating the multiplayer game process of coal-mine safety production is an effective way, which provides a more effective solution to the safety and sustainable development of coal mining industry.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/2685238 |
| spellingShingle | Yan Li Yan Zhang Haifeng Dai Ziyan Zhao Game Modelling and Strategy Research on Trilateral Evolution for Coal-Mine Operational Safety Production System: A Simulation Approach Complexity |
| title | Game Modelling and Strategy Research on Trilateral Evolution for Coal-Mine Operational Safety Production System: A Simulation Approach |
| title_full | Game Modelling and Strategy Research on Trilateral Evolution for Coal-Mine Operational Safety Production System: A Simulation Approach |
| title_fullStr | Game Modelling and Strategy Research on Trilateral Evolution for Coal-Mine Operational Safety Production System: A Simulation Approach |
| title_full_unstemmed | Game Modelling and Strategy Research on Trilateral Evolution for Coal-Mine Operational Safety Production System: A Simulation Approach |
| title_short | Game Modelling and Strategy Research on Trilateral Evolution for Coal-Mine Operational Safety Production System: A Simulation Approach |
| title_sort | game modelling and strategy research on trilateral evolution for coal mine operational safety production system a simulation approach |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/2685238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT yanli gamemodellingandstrategyresearchontrilateralevolutionforcoalmineoperationalsafetyproductionsystemasimulationapproach AT yanzhang gamemodellingandstrategyresearchontrilateralevolutionforcoalmineoperationalsafetyproductionsystemasimulationapproach AT haifengdai gamemodellingandstrategyresearchontrilateralevolutionforcoalmineoperationalsafetyproductionsystemasimulationapproach AT ziyanzhao gamemodellingandstrategyresearchontrilateralevolutionforcoalmineoperationalsafetyproductionsystemasimulationapproach |