Conditional Populist Party Support: The Role of Dissatisfaction and Incumbency
Populists emerge when distrust of state institutions or dissatisfaction with democracy convince voters that claims about conspiring elites blocking the general will are valid. We propose that these dynamics change when populists are incumbents; once they command institutions, their sustained support...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Cambridge University Press
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| Series: | Latin American Research Review |
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| Online Access: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S154242782500001X/type/journal_article |
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| author | Nina Wiesehomeier Saskia Ruth-Lovell Matthew Singer |
| author_facet | Nina Wiesehomeier Saskia Ruth-Lovell Matthew Singer |
| author_sort | Nina Wiesehomeier |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Populists emerge when distrust of state institutions or dissatisfaction with democracy convince voters that claims about conspiring elites blocking the general will are valid. We propose that these dynamics change when populists are incumbents; once they command institutions, their sustained support becomes contingent upon trust in the new institutional order, and they are held accountable for making people think democracy is working well. Newly collected data on party populism and survey data from Latin America show that support for populist parties in the region is conditioned by satisfaction with democracy as well as the incumbency status of populists. Dissatisfied voters support populist opposition parties, but support for populist incumbents is higher among those satisfied with democracy and its institutions. While democratic deficits and poor governance provide openings for populists, populists are held accountable for institutional outcomes. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-068f38e4b20f4982a650a3cab4a54bb3 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1542-4278 |
| language | English |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Latin American Research Review |
| spelling | doaj-art-068f38e4b20f4982a650a3cab4a54bb32025-02-03T05:57:03ZengCambridge University PressLatin American Research Review1542-427812010.1017/lar.2025.1Conditional Populist Party Support: The Role of Dissatisfaction and IncumbencyNina Wiesehomeier0Saskia Ruth-Lovell1Matthew Singer2https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7048-9003IE University, Madrid, SpainRadboud University, Nijmegen, Gelderland, NetherlandsUniversity of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut, USPopulists emerge when distrust of state institutions or dissatisfaction with democracy convince voters that claims about conspiring elites blocking the general will are valid. We propose that these dynamics change when populists are incumbents; once they command institutions, their sustained support becomes contingent upon trust in the new institutional order, and they are held accountable for making people think democracy is working well. Newly collected data on party populism and survey data from Latin America show that support for populist parties in the region is conditioned by satisfaction with democracy as well as the incumbency status of populists. Dissatisfied voters support populist opposition parties, but support for populist incumbents is higher among those satisfied with democracy and its institutions. While democratic deficits and poor governance provide openings for populists, populists are held accountable for institutional outcomes.https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S154242782500001X/type/journal_articlepopulismincumbencydemocratic satisfactionaccountabilitypopulismoincumbenciasatisfacción democráticarendición de cuentas |
| spellingShingle | Nina Wiesehomeier Saskia Ruth-Lovell Matthew Singer Conditional Populist Party Support: The Role of Dissatisfaction and Incumbency Latin American Research Review populism incumbency democratic satisfaction accountability populismo incumbencia satisfacción democrática rendición de cuentas |
| title | Conditional Populist Party Support: The Role of Dissatisfaction and Incumbency |
| title_full | Conditional Populist Party Support: The Role of Dissatisfaction and Incumbency |
| title_fullStr | Conditional Populist Party Support: The Role of Dissatisfaction and Incumbency |
| title_full_unstemmed | Conditional Populist Party Support: The Role of Dissatisfaction and Incumbency |
| title_short | Conditional Populist Party Support: The Role of Dissatisfaction and Incumbency |
| title_sort | conditional populist party support the role of dissatisfaction and incumbency |
| topic | populism incumbency democratic satisfaction accountability populismo incumbencia satisfacción democrática rendición de cuentas |
| url | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S154242782500001X/type/journal_article |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT ninawiesehomeier conditionalpopulistpartysupporttheroleofdissatisfactionandincumbency AT saskiaruthlovell conditionalpopulistpartysupporttheroleofdissatisfactionandincumbency AT matthewsinger conditionalpopulistpartysupporttheroleofdissatisfactionandincumbency |