Research on Taxi Driver Strategy Game Evolution with Carpooling Detour

For the problem of taxi carpooling detour, this paper studies driver strategy choice with carpooling detour. The model of taxi driver strategy evolution with carpooling detour is built based on prospect theory and evolution game theory. Driver stable strategies are analyzed under the conditions of c...

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Main Authors: Wei Zhang, Ruichun He, Changxi Ma, Mingxia Gao
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2018-01-01
Series:Journal of Advanced Transportation
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/2385936
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author Wei Zhang
Ruichun He
Changxi Ma
Mingxia Gao
author_facet Wei Zhang
Ruichun He
Changxi Ma
Mingxia Gao
author_sort Wei Zhang
collection DOAJ
description For the problem of taxi carpooling detour, this paper studies driver strategy choice with carpooling detour. The model of taxi driver strategy evolution with carpooling detour is built based on prospect theory and evolution game theory. Driver stable strategies are analyzed under the conditions of complaint mechanism and absence of mechanism, respectively. The results show that passenger’s complaint mechanism can effectively decrease the phenomenon of driver refusing passengers with carpooling detour. When probability of passenger complaint reaches a certain level, the stable strategy of driver is to take carpooling detour passengers. Meanwhile, limiting detour distance and easing traffic congestion can decrease the possibility of refusing passengers. These conclusions have a certain guiding significance to formulating taxi policy.
format Article
id doaj-art-01b298f3cac04da694e6e011f869924b
institution Kabale University
issn 0197-6729
2042-3195
language English
publishDate 2018-01-01
publisher Wiley
record_format Article
series Journal of Advanced Transportation
spelling doaj-art-01b298f3cac04da694e6e011f869924b2025-02-03T01:10:15ZengWileyJournal of Advanced Transportation0197-67292042-31952018-01-01201810.1155/2018/23859362385936Research on Taxi Driver Strategy Game Evolution with Carpooling DetourWei Zhang0Ruichun He1Changxi Ma2Mingxia Gao3School of Traffic and Transportation, Lanzhou Jiaotong University, Lanzhou 730070, ChinaSchool of Traffic and Transportation, Lanzhou Jiaotong University, Lanzhou 730070, ChinaSchool of Traffic and Transportation, Lanzhou Jiaotong University, Lanzhou 730070, ChinaSchool of Traffic and Transportation, Lanzhou Jiaotong University, Lanzhou 730070, ChinaFor the problem of taxi carpooling detour, this paper studies driver strategy choice with carpooling detour. The model of taxi driver strategy evolution with carpooling detour is built based on prospect theory and evolution game theory. Driver stable strategies are analyzed under the conditions of complaint mechanism and absence of mechanism, respectively. The results show that passenger’s complaint mechanism can effectively decrease the phenomenon of driver refusing passengers with carpooling detour. When probability of passenger complaint reaches a certain level, the stable strategy of driver is to take carpooling detour passengers. Meanwhile, limiting detour distance and easing traffic congestion can decrease the possibility of refusing passengers. These conclusions have a certain guiding significance to formulating taxi policy.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/2385936
spellingShingle Wei Zhang
Ruichun He
Changxi Ma
Mingxia Gao
Research on Taxi Driver Strategy Game Evolution with Carpooling Detour
Journal of Advanced Transportation
title Research on Taxi Driver Strategy Game Evolution with Carpooling Detour
title_full Research on Taxi Driver Strategy Game Evolution with Carpooling Detour
title_fullStr Research on Taxi Driver Strategy Game Evolution with Carpooling Detour
title_full_unstemmed Research on Taxi Driver Strategy Game Evolution with Carpooling Detour
title_short Research on Taxi Driver Strategy Game Evolution with Carpooling Detour
title_sort research on taxi driver strategy game evolution with carpooling detour
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/2385936
work_keys_str_mv AT weizhang researchontaxidriverstrategygameevolutionwithcarpoolingdetour
AT ruichunhe researchontaxidriverstrategygameevolutionwithcarpoolingdetour
AT changxima researchontaxidriverstrategygameevolutionwithcarpoolingdetour
AT mingxiagao researchontaxidriverstrategygameevolutionwithcarpoolingdetour